Violence, Political Instability, and International Trade: Evidence from Kenya’s Cut Flower Sector by Muhammad, Andrew et al.
Violence, Political Instability, and International Trade:  












a Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; amuhummad@ers.usda.gov 
b Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; adsouza@ers.usda.gov 







Paper prepared for presentation at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association’s 






Acknowledgements: The authors would like to thank participants at the 2011 annual meeting of the 
Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.  
 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and may not be attributed to the 
Economic Research Service or the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  
 
1 
 Violence, Political Instability, and International Trade: 
Evidence from Kenya’s Cut Flower Sector 
 
Abstract:  We assess whether and how violence and political instability affect trade between 
developed and developing countries considering the special case of EU imports of Kenyan roses 
after the 2007/08 post-election violence and political instability in Kenya. Using the Rotterdam 
model to estimate EU demand for roses from Kenya and other global competitors, we find evidence 
of a structural change in the import growth rate for Kenya, approximately equivalent to an 18.6% 
tariff. These results highlight the importance of non-tariff barriers to trade and contribute to the 
growing literature on the role of insecurity and instability in hindering international trade.  
 
JEL Codes: F14, F23, F59, O13, Q17 




 1. INTRODUCTION 
On December 30
th, 2007, widespread violence erupted in Kenya following a declaration of results 
from the contested presidential election held three days earlier. Unexpectedly, one of the most stable 
and prosperous democracies in sub-Saharan Africa was in the midst of civil conflict and political 
crisis. By the time a power-sharing agreement was signed on February 28
th, 2008 between the two 
presidential contenders (President Mwai Kibaki and opposition candidate Raila Odinga), over a 
thousand people were killed, more than a half million people were displaced, and property worth 
billions of dollars was damaged (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2008). 
Unsurprisingly, the violence and political instability caused disruptions in economic, political, and 
social activities.  
In this paper, we examine the impact of this political instability and violence on one of 
Kenya’s leading export sectors – the fresh cut flower sector. This sector is primarily export oriented 
and is the second largest foreign exchange earner, after tea (Kenya Ministry of Agriculture, 2010). 
Kenyan flowers are exported mostly to the European Union (EU). We consider whether concerns 
over political instability following the election violence led to a permanent change in the way in 
which EU firms import fresh cut flowers from Kenya vis-à-vis other major global competitors. In 
particular, the conflict may have caused a fundamental shift in how EU firms respond to import-
determining factors such as prices in exporting countries and in how total flower demand is 
allocated across supplying countries.  
When importers are risk averse, increased uncertainty and instability in a given country could 
have a negative impact on imports from that country while simultaneously increasing the demand 
for identical or similar products from less risky source countries (Wolak & Kolstad, 1991). This may 
be especially true for fresh cut flowers, which are highly perishable, thus requiring a stable and 
effective supply chain and an efficient transportation system. Over the recent years, cut flower 
importers and retailers in the EU established contractual relationships with Kenyan producers to 
ensure adequate supplies and timely delivery. This vertical relationship requires a readily accessible 
laborforce (Hale & Opondo, 2005). More specifically, farm workers are a key component in the 
global supply chain because export orders must be satsfied in a short time to ensure fresh delivery. A 
breakdown in the supply chain could result in significant financial losses (Riisgaard, 2009).  
The primary objectives of this study are to analyze the competition between exporting 
countries in the EU flower market and to identify the structural change, if any, in import behavior 
due to the post-election violence and political instability in Kenya. We focus on fresh cut roses, 
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 Kenya’s leading flower export. Of particular interest to our analysis is the relationship between 
Kenya and competing developing country exporters such as Ecuador, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and 
Uganda.  
We estimate the demand for fresh cut roses in the EU assuming an Armington (1969) 
framework. More specifically, we consider rose exports to be heterogeneous due to factors specific 
to the country of origin which allows for assessing the competition among exporting countries in a 
given destination market . In the analysis, we account for potential structural change induced by the 
political violence and political instability. We use the absolute price version of the Rotterdam model 
(Clements & Theil, 1978) to estimate EU demand, and we determine the pattern of structural 
change by applying a gradual switching regression method as specified by Moschini and Meilke  
(1989) and Ohtani, Kakimoto, and Abe (1990). This procedure allows us to assess the structural 
change in importer responsiveness to changes in export prices by country and to determine how 
total import expenditures are allocated across exporting countries. Additionally, we are able to assess 
the structural change in import growth rates for each exporting country holding prices and total 
expenditures constant.  
We use monthly data from January 2001 to December 2010 for the major exporting 
countries and regions involved in the global trade of fresh cut roses. During this period, Kenya, 
Ecuador, and East Africa (an aggregation of Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda) accounted for over 
80% of EU imports of roses on average and separately accounted for 52%, 15%, and 14%, 
respectively.  
Overall, our empirical analysis reveals evidence of a structural change in the import growth 
rate for Kenyan fresh cut flowers after the 2007/08 post-election violence and political instability. 
Before the events in Kenya, the import growth rate was approximately 3% per year, but thereafter, 
the growth rate declined to approximately –2%. However, we do not find evidence that EU 
importers responded differently to import prices. Nor do we find evidence of structural change in 
how total import expenditures were allocated across the supplying countries. But given the 
importance of the fresh cut flower sector for Kenyan exports and more generally economic growth, 
the depressed import growth rates could have potentially serious implications for the country’s 
economic prospects.  
Further, our findings suggest that even short stints in instability and violence can lead to 
significant changes in importer behavior with long-term repercussions for international trade if, for 
example, the results reflect a loss of long term contracts to competitors due to a decline in trust on 
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 the side of EU traders. These findings complement – and are consistent with – two recent 
microeconomic studies that analyze the impact of the Kenyan conflict on the behavior of flower 
exporting firms using firm-level data. Ksoll, Macchiavello, & Morjaria (2009; 2010) find a 24 percent 
reduction in flower exports, a 38 percent reduction in exports for firms in conflict-affected areas, 
and a 50 percent increase in worker absence as a result of the conflict. They also find that firms 
consolidated their shipments and exported less frequently during the conflict period, most likely in 
reaction to higher security expenses. While these analyses demonstrate an immediate and significant 
impact of the violence on the operations and the performance of exporting firms, the current paper 
provides a more comprehensive macroeconomic picture of the fresh cut flower sector. We focus 
more broadly on changes in the trade patterns between the EU, Kenya, and other major global 
competitors.     
Our analysis contributes to a large literature on the linkages between economic outcomes 
(e.g., economic growth, international trade) and (i) insecurity (e.g., corruption, imperfect contract 
enforcement) and (ii) instability (e.g., coups, internal and external conflicts, terrorism). Using cross-
country data over three decades and controlling for various factors that impact economic growth, 
Alesina, et al. (1996) find that countries with a higher degree of political instability experience lower 
growth in per capita GDP. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) argue that insecurity can serve as a 
hidden tax on trade, raising the price of traded goods and placing certain countries at a comparative 
disadvantage. Nunn (2007) argues that imperfect contract enforcement can be a larger barrier than 
resource endowments. Belloc (2006) provides a broad survey of the literature linking factors in 
domestic institutional environments to international trade patterns. Generally, poor functioning 
domestic institutions and insecurity increase transaction costs between exporters and importers and 
thus reduce the incentives to create and maintain trading relationships. 
  Several recent studies analyze more explicitly the consequences of conflict and violence.
1 For 
example, Blomberg, et al. (2004) examine the impact of various forms of violence on economic 
growth, and Blomberg and Hess (2006) examine their impact on international trade.  The authors 
estimate a series of regression models (and additionally a structural VAR model in the case of 
growth rates) using over three decades of annual data from 177 countries. They find that terrorism, 
internal conflicts, and external conflicts have economically and statistically significant impacts on 
both economic growth and bilateral trade. In fact, the latter article shows that the presence of 
                                                 
1 Blattman and Miguel (2010) present a review of the literature on the economic causes and consequences of civil wars.  
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 violence can be equivalent to as much as a 30% tariff. Similarly, our analysis provides evidence of 
the “hidden tax” on international trade resulting from violence and instability. 
  The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section we provide an overview 
of the fresh cut flower sector in Kenya – both from a domestic and an EU perspective. In section 
three, we describe the post-election instability and violence and the implications for the cut flower 
sector. In section four, we present the empirical model and data used to estimate the demand for 
imported roses in the EU. In section five, we describe the estimation procedure and we discuss the 
main results. In the last section, we conclude with a brief summary and a discussion of implications 
of the research findings.  
 
2. THE CUT FLOWER SECTOR IN KENYA 
The production of cut flowers in Kenya began with the investment of Europeans living in Kenya in 
the 1960s and 1970s (Hughes, 2000). Major investment over the past two decades and duty-free 
access to the EU has contributed to strong growth in the sector. Today Kenya is one of the world’s 
largest exporters of fresh cut flowers, including roses, carnations, statice, alstromeria, lilies and 
hypericum. The sector is estimated to employ approximately 50,000 to 60,000 people directly and 
over 500,000 people indirectly (Kenya Flower Council, 2009). The cut flower sector is part of the 
horticulture industry, which is a core component of Kenyan agriculture. The agricultural industry 
accounts for about one quarter of GDP and 60% of export earnings and is the source of livelihood 
for the majority of Kenyans (International Monetary Fund, 2010). The Government of Kenya has 
supported the industry by establishing enabling legislation, intellectual property rights, functional 
quality control and other regulatory regimes, and market incentives for private enterprises to thrive. 
The Horticultural Crops Development Authority was established by the Government of Kenya 
under the Agriculture Act of 1967 to help develop and regulate the horticulture industry, which 
includes flowers, fruits and vegetables. Over the past decade, annual growth rates in horticulture 
have been between 15% and 20%, with earnings of approximately US$ 30 billion in 2009 (Kenya 
Ministry of Agriculture, 2010). Furthermore, horticulture is one of the fastest growing sectors in the 
Kenyan economy, largely attributable to cut flower exports (Barrientos, Dolan, & Tallontire, 2003). 
Kenya is a major global supplier of flowers. The success of the cut flower sector is due to 
several key factors, namely, an ideal climate, good infrastructure, proximity to large import markets, 
and an enabling policy environment. According to the Horticultural Crops Development Authority, 
over 2,000 hectares of agricultural land in Kenya is used for cut flower cultivation. The major 
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 flower-growing areas are Naivasha, Thika, Limuru, Nairobi and the Athi river plains in the west, and 
the Nakuru, Nanyuki, Mount Kenya region, and Eldoret in the north. Naivasha − located about 100 
kilometers northwest of Nairobi − accounts for about 50% of the total land under cut flower 
cultivation, and about one-quarter of all flower exporters are located in the region. Additionally, the 
area is in close proximity to the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport and it is linked by the Nairobi-
Nakuru highway; well-developed transportation networks are particularly important since fresh cut 
flowers are highly perishable. 
There are currently about 160 flower growers who constitute mainly medium to large scale 
commercial operations. However, according to Kiptum (2005), the flower industry has been 
dominated by 24 very large commercial enterprises which contribute more than 72% of the total 
flower exports and which cultivate land of between 20 to 100 hectares each, and employ about 250 
to 6,000 workers each. These large scale growers are a combination of foreign-owned and/or joint 
ventures between foreigners and Kenyan entrepreneurs. The predominant investors are European 
producers who outsource the cultivation of flowers to Kenya during the winter season in Europe. 
Such operations are vertically integrated and require high capital investments in green houses, 
excellent managerial skills and marketing infrastructure (such as freight-forwarding and cargo 
planes), research laboratories, advanced technology and cultivation techniques. Large-scale 
cultivation accounts for about 97% of Kenya’s exports of cut flowers. These exporting firms have 
marketing networks located in Europe to assist in the sale, distribution and collection of market 
information. Smaller scale growers, on the other hand, tend to be locally owned with low capital 
investments and less advanced technology; they usually concentrate on growing summer flowers that 
are grown outdoors. 
In 2008, floriculture exports in Kenya were approximately US$ 600 million, with the EU 
being the primary destination (Kenya Flower Council, 2009).
2 Roses make up over 70% of all trees, 
plants, buds, roots, flowers and foliage exported from Kenya (Muhammad, 2009). According to the 
United Nations, EU member states accounted for eight of the top ten importing countries and over 
60% of global rose trade in 2009 (US$ 2.4 billion). EU imports of Kenyan roses increased steadily 
from around 3 million kilograms (kg) per month in 2002 to about 6 million kg in 2008 and 2009 (see 
                                                 
2 EU countries account for over 90% of Kenya’s flower exports. 
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 figure 1). In 2010, rose imports in the EU were valued at US$ 741 million; Kenya – the leading 
supplier – accounted for about half of this total.
3  
The EU imports significantly less roses from the other global suppliers. Imports from 
Ecuador average about one million kg per month since 2001. Imports from other East African 
countries (Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda) are relatively small as well, though average imports from 
these countries increased from about one million kg per month in 2006 to three million kg per 
month in 2010. Recently, Ethiopia has emerged as a global competitor in international cut flower 
trade, particularly in the EU market; this may have been due in part to the post-election violence and 
political instability in Kenya. For instance, during the February 2008 Valentine’s Day season (when 
EU demand for roses is relatively high), it was reported that rose exports from Ethiopia to the EU 
were particularly high due to the ongoing violence in Kenya (Muhammad, 2009). 
We fit a polynomial trend to the raw import data for the EU (figure 1). We observe that EU 
imports from Kenya trend upward until the period of political instability, level off shortly thereafter, 
and then commence a steady decline. These patterns, though not conclusive, suggest that there was 
a change in EU imports from Kenya beginning in early 2008. In the empirical work that follows, we 
estimate EU demand for roses by source country in order to quantify potential changes that 
occurred during and after this time period.  
 
3. THE POST-ELECTION CONFLICT 
On December 27, 2007, Kenyans voted in their fourth general election since the return of the 
multiparty system.  Despite serious concerns over voting irregularities by international and domestic 
observers and evidence from exit polls showing large gains for the opposition party – including a 
narrow margin of victory for opposition presidential candidate Raila Odinga – on December 30
th the 
Electoral Commission officially declared victory for President Mwai Kibaki. He was sworn in later 
that day and violence erupted throughout the country. Political instability and wide-spread conflict 
continued for nearly two months until representatives from the African Union and the United 
Nations were able to broker a compromise between the political factions. On February 28
th, 2008 a 
power-sharing agreement established the position of Prime Minister for Mr. Odinga and doubled the 
number of cabinet positions to incorporate more opposition members; Mr. Kibaki remained 
                                                 
3 This value does not include intra-EU trade. These statistics were obtained from the European Commission, Eurostat 
statistical database. 
8 
 President. Violence gradually subsided, though tensions remained high as displaced populations 
slowly returned to their communities.  
The conflict was fought primarily along ethnic lines, between the Luo and Kalenjin 
(supporters of Odinga) and the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru (supporters of Kibaki). It affected six of 
eight provinces, mainly in the following regions: Nairobi, Rift Valley, Coast, and Western. According 
to a report by the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (2008), community grievances 
included discrimination in economic and political power and the distribution of wealth, as well as 
violations of economic, social and land rights. The violence was manifested in several ways: burning 
and looting of residential and commercial property; targeted violence against small farmers and 
landholders; and retaliatory targeted violence against migrant workers (Kenya National Commission 
on Human Rights, 2008). 
    The conflict impacted all sectors of the economy. Tourism declined as trips were canceled 
and foreign governments issued travel warnings. Agriculture and manufacturing experienced 
difficulties as input costs increased, workers were displaced, and transportation became more 
insecure and unpredictable; also, overall investor confidence declined (International Monetary Fund, 
2010). Violence in the central town of Naivasha, which grows most of Kenya’s flowers, led to an 
immediate drop in worker turnout (Muhammad, 2009). And, as mentioned above, firm-level 
evidence reveals that the cut flower sector experienced negative consequences. Ksoll, Macchiavello, 
and Morjaria (2009; 2010) find that the conflict had an immediate impact on exporting firms 
through two main channels – worker absence and transportation difficulties. They argue that the 
absence of workers was the main driver since flowers need to be harvested at specific times and 
delays can cause losses in these highly perishable goods. In addition to disrupting the economy, the 
violence may have had long lasting costs in social coherence such as ethnic distrust and suspicion, 
reflected in ethno-nationalism after the crisis (Kagwanja, 2009). 
 
4. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this section, we present the methodology and empirical framework for modeling the aggregate 
behavior of importing firms and assessing the effects of the political conflict on EU import demand. 
Following Armington (1969), imports are assumed to be differentiated by country of origin, which is 
due in part to product attributes (stem length, bud size, color, etc.), but also in part to perceived 
differences such as the reliability and consistency of an exporting country. In this context, roses 
from the ith exporting source are treated as an individual good that is part of the product group roses.  
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 A good (rose) from one country is considered to be an imperfect substitute for goods (roses) from 
other sources due to origin specific factors. Letting other product groups be similarly defined, a 
multistage budgeting process is assumed. First total expenditures are allocated across the various 
product groups; second, total rose expenditures are allocated across the supplying countries (Seale, 
Sparks, & Buxton, 1992). For product groups unrelated to roses, preferences are assumed block 
independent, and for related product groups like other plants and flowers, preferences are assumed 
blockwise dependent. Block independence indicates that consumption of other goods has no effect 
on the utility derived from roses. Blockwise dependence indicates that the utility interaction between 
roses and related product groups is independent of the individual goods within each group (Theil & 
Clements, 1987). For instance, the utility interaction between roses and carnations are the same 
regardless of the country of origin. Under these assumptions, we can derive an import demand 
system limited to roses. 
We use the absolute price version of the Rotterdam model to estimate EU demand for roses 
by source.  Let q and p denote the quantity and price, respectively, i and j denote the exporting 
sources, and n the number of sources. Following Theil (1980) and Theil and Clements (1987), the 
demand for roses from the ith country is specified as follows: 
1
(ln ) (ln ) (ln )
n
it it i t ij jt it
j
wd q d Q d p θ π
=
=+ ∑ ε +
)
i
        ( 1 )  
where wit is the conditional expenditure share for the ith country . θi is the 
marginal expenditure share ( 
1 (/
n




ii i i i pq pq θ
= =∂ ∂∑ ). Note that θi measures how an additional unit 
of total expenditures is allocated to the ith source. d(ln Qt) is the Divisia volume index  
. The Divisia volume index is a measure of the change in real 
expenditures on all imported roses (
1 (( l n ) ( l n
n
t i it dQ w dq
= =∑ ) ) i t
Theil, 1980). πij is the Slutsky price coefficient or relative price 
effect which measures the impact of the price in country  j on the quantity imported from country i.  
εit is a random error term.
4 
Following the methodology of Moschini and Meilke (1989) and Ohtani, Kakimoto, and Abe 
(1990) and the empirical applications of Gil, et al. (2004) and Peterson and Chen (2005), the 
                                                 
4 The Rotterdam model requires that the following restrictions be met in order to conform to theoretical 
considerations:∑iθi = 1 and ∑iπij = 0 (adding up); ∑jπij (homogeneity), and πij = πji (symmetry).  Additionally, the Slutsky 
price matrix Π = [πij] should be negative semidefinite (Theil, 1980).   
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 structural change in import demand is modeled assuming a common time path for all parameters in 
the system. Denoting this time path as ht, the Rotterdam model with structural change is 
parameterized as follows: 
1
( l n) ( ) ( l n) ( ) ( l n )
n
it it i i t i i t t ij ij t jt it
j
wd q h h d Q h d p α δθ λ π ν
=
=+ ++ + + + ∑ ε     (2) 
The constant term αi is added to account for import trends, and the term δiht is the structural 
adjustment in the trend effect. Similarly, λiht is the structural adjustment in the expenditure effect 
and νiht is the structural adjustment in the relative price effect.  When estimating the model, α, δ, θ, 
λ, π, and ν are treated as fixed parameters. The hypothesis of δ = λ = ν = 0 implies no structural 
change.
5  The time path ht is defined such that equation (2) becomes a gradual switching regression 
model where: 
1
12 1 1 2
2
0 for 1,...,














.        
There are three distinct periods to consider when assessing the structural change in demand: the pre-
conflict period (ht = 0), the transition period  12 1 (() / ( t ht ) ) τ ττ = −− , and the post-conflict period (ht 
= 1). τ1 is the conflict starting point, τ2 is the starting point of the post-conflict period, and T is the 
end of the sample period.  Note that the transition from the pre-conflict to the post-conflict period 
can be immediate 21 (1 ) τ τ =+ or gradual 21 (1 ) >+ τ τ depending on the size of τ2 relative to τ1 
(Moschini & Meilke, 1989). We use the log likelihood value to determine the optimal transition 
period. More details on this procedure are in the following section. 
Of particular interest to our research question is the impact of structural change on the 
import demand elasticities. The conditional expenditure elasticity with structural change is
() / ii i hw i η θλ =+ . Note that ηi measures the percentage responsiveness of imports from the ith 
exporting country to percentage changes in total import expenditures in the EU. The conditional 
(income compensated) price elasticity of demand with structural change is () ij ij ij i hw / η πν =+ , 
where ηij measures the percentage responsiveness of imports from the ith exporting country to a 
percentage change in the price in exporting country j.  Further, we can define a trend elasticity as 
                                                 
5 Additional restrictions are required for adding-up, homogeneity and symmetry: 
0 iiii j iiii ==== ∑∑∑∑ αδλν  (adding up),  0 ij j = ∑ ν  (homogeneity), and  ij ji = ν ν   (symmetry). 
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 () / ii i gh i w α δ =+ , which is also the rate of growth in imports from the ith country holding prices 
and total expenditures constant. If the structural change in demand is significant, we would expect 
these measures to be statistically different when h = 1 and when h = 0.  
We use monthly data from January 2001 to December 2010 to estimate equation (2), 
provided by the External Trade Section of the Statistical Office of the European Communities 
(Eurostat). The data are defined according to the CN8 classification, which includes “fresh cut roses 
and buds of a kind suitable for bouquets or for ornamental purposes.” Import quantities are 
measured in units of 100 kg and import values are in Euros. Values are on a cost-insurance-freight 
(CIF) basis and import prices are calculated by dividing the value of the commodity by the quantity, 
resulting in a Euro per 100 kg unit of measure. We considered the main exporting sources for the 
analysis: Kenya, Ecuador, and East Africa. The remaining exporting sources are designated as the 
rest of the world (ROW). East Africa is comprised of Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda. Although 
flower auctions in Holland play an integral role in supplying roses to the EU, intra-EU trade is 
excluded from the analysis to avoid the double counting of imports since there is no way to 
differentiate between intra-EU imports produced in the Netherlands and re-exports.
6   
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables in the model. During the sample 
period, imports from Kenya averaged 4.7 million kg and 17.1 million euros per month - over three 
times the average for East Africa and ROW and over four times the average for Ecuador (in terms 
of quantity). On average, Kenya and East Africa were the least expensive sources; prices averaged 
€3.67/kg and €3.81/kg, respectively. Ecuador was considerably more expensive, at €5.52/kg, which 
is in part due to relative proximity to the EU resulting in higher freight cost. Kenya accounted for 
the largest share of extra-EU imports averaging 51.7% for the sample period. ROW was second at 
18.8%, while Ecuador and East Africa accounted for 15.5% and 14%, respectively. 
 
5. ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
In estimating the Rotterdam model, continuous log differences are typically replaced with finite one-
period log differences. Given the importance of seasonality in the cut flower sector and the 
frequency of the data, we use the 12
th difference to control for seasonality (Lee, 1988). Thus, we 
approximate the quantity and price terms in equation (2) as  12 (ln ) ln ln tt dq q q − t ≈ −  and 
                                                 
6 Furthermore, in addition to imported roses, it would be ideal to include roses produced and consumed within a 
member state (domestic sales); however, data on domestic sales are not readily available.  
12 
 12 (ln ) ln ln tt dp p p − ≈− t , respectively. Further, we replace the expenditure share wit with 
12 0.5( ) it it it ww w − =+ , which is the expenditure share averaged over the periods t and t-12, and we 
replace the Divisia volume index d(lnQt) with a discrete measure DQt where 
12 1 (ln ln )
n
ti t i t i t i DQ w q q − = =− ∑  (Theil, 1980; Theil & Clements, 1987).   
In our preliminary analysis, we found that the error in equation (2) was not random but 
follows a first-order autoregressive process,  1 it it it ε ρε μ − = +  where εit ∼ N(0,σμ). Thus to account 
for autocorrelation, we estimate the model using a maximum likelihood procedure for singular 
equation systems with autoregressive disturbances as specified by Beach & MacKinnon (1979), 
where ρ is constrained equal across all equations to preserve the adding-up property. The benefits of 
the Beach and MacKinnon method are that the log likelihood function is specified such that the 
error process is stationary (the characteristic roots of ρ lie within the unit circle) and the errors of the 
initial period have some effect on the parameters. 
The first step in the estimation procedure is to determine the transition period. Following 
Moschini and Meilke (1989), we assume that the optimal transition period should maximize the log 
likelihood function. Since the conflict was not anticipated, we set the value of τ1 to that of 
December 2007. Given τ1, we assume the following values for τ2:  21 1 = + τ τ (January 2008); 
21 4 τ τ =+ 21 (April 2008);  7 τ τ =+ (July 2008);  21 10 τ τ = + (October 2008); and  21 13 τ τ =+(January 
2009).  These values represent an immediate or abrupt transition, and a one-, two-, and three-quarter 
transition, and one-year transition, respectively. We estimate equation (2) for each value of τ2. The 
results are displayed in Table 2. The results indicate that the log likelihood value is maximized when 
the transition period is one quarter. Therefore in the next step, we assume a one quarter transition 
period when testing for structural breaks. Our results indicate that the transition period consists of 
the months during which the violence occurred and that any structural change in importer behavior 
was apparent immediately after the violence subsided.   
We use likelihood ratio (LR) tests to determine the significance of structural change in 
demand. We consider three separate hypotheses: (i) no structural change in the trend effects (δ = 0); 
(ii) no structural change in expenditure effects (λ = 0); and (iii) no structural change in price effects 
(ν = 0). The results, displayed in Table 3, indicate that structural change in the expenditure and price 
estimates should be rejected, but the structural change in the trend estimates cannot be rejected. 
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 While we find no evidence that the conflict had an effect on how firms responded to import prices 
and total expenditures, we do find evidence of a significant change in import trends after controlling 
for prices and total expenditures. More specifically, we find that the growth rate for imports from 
Kenya, which was positive (and significant) before the conflict, became negative (and significant) 
after the conflict, and that imports from Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, and ROW appear to have 
benefited from this displaced trade (details to follow). 
We find that the trend estimates (αi), which measure the pattern of imports holding prices 
and total expenditures constant, are significant and positive for Kenya (0.0156) and East Africa 
(0.0084) and negative for the ROW (-0.0218). Table 4 displays demand estimates for the EU. All 
estimates are homogeneity and symmetry constrained with first-order autoregressive disturbances.  
These estimates indicate that imports from Kenya and East Africa were increasing before the 
conflict, ceteris paribus. However, after the conflict, the structural change estimates (δi) indicate a 
negative trend for Kenya (-0.0257) but a positive trend for East Africa (0.0068).  
Next we examine the marginal share of total expenditures that go to each exporting country. 
Recall that the marginal share estimates (θi) measure how a unit increase in total import expenditure 
is allocated across the four exporting countries. Since Kenya is the leading exporter, we expect its 
marginal share to be relatively large when compared to the other countries, which is what we find. 
The results indicate that for every one-euro increase in total imports, on average, 0.51 went to 
Kenya, 0.16 to Ecuador, 0.15 to East Africa, and 0.18 to ROW. The own-price estimates (πii) are 
negative and significant for Kenya, Ecuador and East Africa. Consistent with theory, an increase in 
the price for a particular source causes EU firms to decrease imports from that source. The cross-
price estimates (πij) indicate a significant competitive relationship (substitutes) between Kenya and 
Ecuador (0.0393) and between Kenya and East Africa (0.0381). When converted to elasticities, these 
estimates indicate that a one percent increase in Kenyan prices caused the EU to increase imports 
from Ecuador and East Africa by 0.26% and 0.27%, respectively. 
We find that the expenditures elasticities are statistically significant but not different from 
unity, which implies that import preferences are homothetic and the conditional expenditure shares 
(wi) are independent of the level of total expenditure such that firms spend a constant share of total 
expenditures on a particular source on average. Table 5 displays the expenditure elasticities and 
income compensated and uncompensated own-price elasticities. The income compensated price 
elasticity only accounts for the substitution effect of a price change while the uncompensated price 
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 elasticity accounts for the substitution and income effects. Seale, Sparks, and Buxton (1992) show 
that the uncompensated own-price elasticity is derived as the difference between the compensated 
elasticity and marginal share (ηii - θi). The estimated own-price elasticities (income compensated and 
uncompensated) indicate that import demand in the EU is inelastic for all countries. For instance, 
the uncompensated elasticities indicate that a one percent increase in price is associated with a 
decline in imports from Kenya by 0.74%, Ecuador by 0.46%, East Africa by 0.34%, and ROW by 
0.32%. 
Next we derive and compare statistically the growth rates for each country across the two 
periods: pre- and post-conflict. Since we use annual (12
th) differences to estimate the model, the 
estimated growth rates are annual and not monthly.
7 Following Moschini and Meilke (1989) and Gil, 
et al. (2004), we derive the growth rate estimates using period-specific averages of the expenditure 
share wi. For the pre-conflict estimates, we average w over the period January 2001-December 2007,
1
1 1 / it it t ww
= =∑
τ
τ .  For the post-conflict estimates, we average w over the period April 2008-
December 2010, 
2 2 /( )
T
it it t ww T
= =− ∑ τ τ . 
The results, displayed in Table 6, indicate that Kenya is the only country with a significant 
negative import growth rate after the conflict. Prior to the conflict, imports from Kenya were 
increasing by 3% per year on average, but after the conflict, imports were decreasing by 1.9% per 
year. Although the market share for East Africa more than doubled after the conflict, the growth 
rate remained unchanged indicating that imports continued to grow at around 7% to 8% per year. 
For ROW, imports were declining by nearly 10% per year before the conflict; after the conflict 
however, imports were no longer declining. For Ecuador, we find no statistically significant change 
in the import growth rate. These estimates represent the change in imports after controlling for any 
changes due to prices, total expenditures, seasonality, and random disturbances. Therefore, the 
actual percentage change in EU imports from each country could be very different from the 
estimated growth rates due to changes in the factors assumed to be constant, namely changes in 
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7 Note that if log          , then log     log        12 . 6. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
In this paper, we assess whether and how internal conflict and political instability affect international 
trade, with a particular focus on exports from developing countries, which can be an important 
source of growth. We consider exports of fresh cut flowers (specifically, roses) from Kenya to the 
EU as a special case and examine the impact of the 2007/08 post-election violence and political 
instability in Kenya.  
We use the Rotterdam model and monthly EU import data from January 2000 to December 
2010 to estimate EU demand for roses from Kenya and other major global competitors. We find no 
change in how EU firms respond to import prices and total expenditures. However, after controlling 
for prices and total expenditure, we find a structural change in the growth rate trends in EU imports 
from Kenya. In particular, before the conflict, the growth rate of EU imports from Kenya was 
positive (3% annual); after the conflict, it was negative (-1.9% annual), ceteris paribus. Given Kenya’s 
important position in the global cut flower trade, this decline may have led to permanent changes in 
the international trade landscape. In fact, the evidence suggests that the changes brought on by the 
post-election violence and instability may have benefited other major competitors in East Africa and 
around the globe.  
To quantify the potential impact of the results, we calculate the tariff equivalent of the 
events in Kenya. In 2007, imports from Kenya totaled approximately 68 million kg, valued at €3.56 
per kg. If the rate of growth had remained at 3%, imports would have increased to approximately 
74.3 million kg by 2010, other factors held constant. Rather, we found a –2% growth rate, resulting 
in a projected fall to approximately 64 million kg by 2010. The resulting loss is approximately 10.3 
million kg or €36.7 million, valued at 2007 prices. The estimated own-price elasticity for Kenya 
(-0.745) can be used to assess the price change or tariff rate required to attain a comparable loss. 
Assuming tariffs are passed through fully to import prices, we find an 18.6% tariff equivalent to the 
decrease in imports associated with the post-election violence and instability. These results 
underscore the importance of non-tariff barriers to trade and, in particular, the critical role that 
insecurity and instability can play in hindering a country’s export potential. 
Kenya’s experiences with instability and its effect on flower trade with the EU are not 
unique within the Africa context. A decade earlier, the fresh cut flower sector in Zimbabwe 
experienced an even more severe decline in exports to the EU. In 2000−2001, Zimbabwe was the 
second leading exporter of roses to the EU, accounting for about one quarter of total EU imports. 
EU imports from Zimbabwe were valued at nearly €50 million per year, about four times the value 
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 of imports from Uganda and five times the value of imports from Tanzania. At that time, imports 
from Ethiopia were less than one million euros. Fresh cut rose exports from Zimbabwe to the EU 
peaked in 2001 and then began a long decline. By 2006, exports to the EU were valued at €17 
million, less than exports from Uganda and Ethiopia (about €20 million each). This substantial 
decline is attributed to several simultaneous factors, including the economic decline of the country, 
weak institutions, conflict and insecurity, and a decline in agricultural productivity. Power (2003) and 
Clemens and Moss (2005) suggest that the decline in agricultural productivity may have been caused 
by the land reform policies of the Zimbabwean government which resulted in farm seizures in 2000. 
The land reform policies, and the violence that followed, displaced farmers and workers. In fact, 
these policies may have contributed to the emergence of Ethiopia in EU flower trade since a 
number of displaced farmers relocated to Ethiopia to continue in cut flower production. The 
country also experienced election violence and had sanctions imposed by the EU in 2002, 
compounding the challenges to maintaining a strong fresh cut flower sector. Today, Zimbabwe is no 
longer a major player in fresh cut flower trade with the EU.  
While the Kenyan Government continues to promote the fresh cut flower sector and 
agricultural-led export growth more generally, the study reveals, that non-economic factors may 
hinder the country’s economic prospects. Despite its large presence in the EU cut flower market, 
Kenya’s leading exporter status is vulnerable to even short bouts of violence or instability given the 
highly perishable nature of the goods and the importance of a reliable supply chain. And rose 
production in East African competing exporters has been growing recently as European 
entrepreneurs seek to diversify their investments across the region. Though these East African 
countries may not pose an impending threat to Kenya, we do find evidence that EU importers 
immediately substituted Kenyan roses for roses from these other African countries following the 
post-election crisis. Therefore, political leaders and policy makers may want to consider the 
economic costs of conflict and political instability as they seek to support the fresh cut flower sector 
and other export oriented sectors.    
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 Table 1. Summary Statistics for Model Variables: January 2001–December 2010 
 Mean  Std.  Dev. Min. Max. 
Country  Monthly Quantity (kilograms)
Ecuador 946,398  347,992 333,100 1,810,300 
Kenya 4,705,073  1,534,441 1,667,900 7,711,800 
East Africa  1,398,737  996,987 315,000 3,712,200 
ROW 1,412,573  549,559 534,200 2,811,900 
 Monthly  Value  (€)
Ecuador 5,372,208  2,495,260 1,457,110 12,988,000 
Kenya 17,128,900  5,451,303 6,679,374 28,743,400 
East Africa  5,015,444  3,399,342 1,340,981 13,081,300 
ROW 5,942,935  2,887,667 2,185,465 16,916,700 
 Price  (€/kilogram)
Ecuador 5.519  0.755 2.463 7.795 
Kenya 3.671  0.288 3.177 4.492 
East Africa  3.811  0.551 2.838 5.479 
ROW 4.131  0.644 3.028 6.185 
  Market Share (%)
Ecuador 15.49  3.18 9.51 24.50 
Kenya 51.67  6.45 30.88 64.47 
East Africa  13.99  6.26 4.71 30.02 
ROW 18.86  8.97 7.53 42.31 




 Table 2. Length of transition period and regression log likelihood value 
Transition period  Log likelihood value
Immediate 885.570
One quarter  886.359
Two quarters  885.552
Three quarters  885.385




 Table 3. Likelihood ratio tests for structural change  











  P-value 
Unrestricted 886.359  
Trends 875.284 22.150 7.82(3)
a 0.000 
Expenditures 883.043 6.632 7.82(3) 0.085 
Prices 884.576 3.565 16.92(9) 0.938 




 Table 4. Import demand and structural change estimates  
Parameter Ecuador  Kenya East  Africa ROW
Trend (αi)  -0.0022 0.0156 0.0084 -0.0218 










  Price effects matrix (Π) 
Ecuador -0.0455  0.0393 0.0053 0.0009
 (0.0131)
*** (0.0186)
** (0.096) (0.0124) 
Kenya   -0.1202 0.0381 0.0429
   (0.0424)
*** (0.0193)
** (0.0263) 
East Africa    -0.0255 -0.0179 
   (0.0150)
* (0.0130) 
ROW   -0.0259 
   (0.0235) 
  Structural change estimates
Trend (δi)  0.0026 -0.0257 0.0068 0.0162















Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Homogeneity and symmetry 
are imposed on the price effects matrix. ROW is the rest of the world. 
***, **, and * denotes 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 significance level, respectively.  




 Table 5. Import demand elasticities 





Ecuador 1.042  (0.158)  -0.296(0.086) -0.456(0.091) 
Kenya 0.978  (0.079)  -0.230(0.081) -0.742(0.094) 
East Africa  1.105 (0.149)  -0.185(0.109)
a -0.337(0.109) 
ROW 0.948  (0.160)  -0.139(0.138)
b -0.315(0.127) 
 Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
Unless specified otherwise, all elasticities are significant at the 0.05 level. 
a Significant at the 0.10 level. 
b Insignificant estimate. 












2001:1-2007:12 2008:4-2010:12    Difference 
Country Market  Share  Annual growth rates  
Ecuador 0.150  0.158  -0.015(0.144) 0.003(0.018)   0.017  (0.022)
Kenya 0.524  0.524  0.030(0.007)
*** -0.019(0.009)
**  -0.049  (0.011)
***
East Africa  0.103  0.213  0.082(0.018)
*** 0.072(0.011)
***  -0.010  (0.020)
ROW 0.223  0.106  -0.098(0.012)
*** -0.053(0.033)  0.045  (0.033)
Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** and ** denote the 0.01 and 0.05 significance level, respectively. 
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Figure 1. Rose imports in the EU by source: January 2001−December 2010 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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